Charles B. Jackson v. Dale Dockstader, d/b/a/ The Cliffrose Lodge and Gardens; The Town of Springdale; Norman Swapp: Eric Ludlow; Washington County; The State of Utah and Does I thorugh CC : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Charles B. Jackson v. Dale Dockstader, d/b/a/ The
Cliffrose Lodge and Gardens; The Town of
Springdale; Norman Swapp: Eric Ludlow;
Washington County; The State of Utah and Does I
thorugh CC : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Floyd W Holm; J. Bryan Jackson; Attorneys for Appellant.
Mark Larsen; Campbell, Maack, Sessions; Lynn J. Lund; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Jackson v. Dockstader, No. 920718 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4706
AH 
CUMENT 
,-U 
10 
DCKET NO. 
IN 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES B. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DALE DOCKSTADER, d/b/a/ THE 
CLIFFROSE LODGE AND GARDENS; 
THE TOWN OF SPRINGDALE; NORMAN 
SWAPP; ERIC LUDLOW; WASHINGTON 
COUNTY; THE STATE OF UTAH and 
DOES I through CC, 
Defendants/Appellees, 
92-0728-04 
Pr io r i ty No. 16 
Supreme Court No. 920162 
Fifth District Court 
Civil No. 910500135 CV 
R E P L Y B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T J A C K S O N 
Appeal from the Fifth District Court of Washington County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. PHILIP EVES District Judge 
FLOYD W HOLM, USB // 1522 
965 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 265 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-6532 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, #4483 
111 North Main Street 
Post Office Box 519 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-8450 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant JACKSON 
MARK LARSEN, USB // 3727 
CAMPBELL, MAACK, SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(001) 537-5555 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee DOCKSTADER 
LYNN J. LUND, USB # 2017 
Attorney for Defendant SWAPP 
560 East 200 South #220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 355-5609 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee SWAPP 
FILED 
NOV 4 1992 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES B. JACKSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DALE DOCKSTADER, d/b/a/ THE 
CLIFFROSE LODGE AND GARDENS; 
THE TOWN OF SPRINGDALE; NOPMAN 
SWAPP; ERIC LUDLOW; WASHINGTON 
COUNTY; THE STATE OF UTAH and 
DOSS T throuyh CC, 
Defendants/Appellees, 
Priority No. 16 
Supreme Court No. 920162 
Fifth District Court 
Civil No. 910500135 CV 
R E P L Y B R I E F O F A P P E L L A N T J A C K S O N 
Appeal from the Fifth District Court of Washington County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. PHILIP EVEC District Judge 
FLOYD W HOLM, USB // 1522 
965 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 265 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-6532 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, //4 4S8 
111 North Main Street 
Post Office Box 519 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-8450 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant JACKSON 
MARK LARSEN, USB // 3727 
CAMPBELL, MAACK, SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, 13th Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(001) 537-5555 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee DOCKSTADER 
LYNN J. LUND, USB # 2017 
Attorney for Defendant SWAPP 
560 East 200 South //220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 355-5609 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee SWAPP 
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
ARGUMENT- POINT NO. 1 3 
ARGUIIENT- POINT NO. 2 6 
ARGUMENT- POINT NO. 3 10 
ARGUMENT- POINT NO. 4 11 
ARGUMENT- POINT NO. 5 16 
ARGUMENT- POINT NO. 6 17 
CONCLUSION 13 
DATED and SIGNED BY ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 19 
T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S 
CASES 
Barber v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 751 
P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988) 1 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1989) 1 
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App.) 
(Cert, granted 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989)) 2 
Geneva Pipe Company v. S & H Insurance Company, 
714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). 2 
Greenwall v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 575 P.2d 688 (Utah 1978). 15 
Haas v. Emmett, 23 Utah 2 138, 459 P.2d 432 (1969) 15 
Hodges v. Gibson Products, Co., 811 P.2d 151 (1991) 11 
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976) 12 
Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967) 4 
State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985) 14,15 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554 (1980) 3 
STATUTES 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
CHARLES B. JACKSON, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. : 
DALE DOCKSTADEK, d/b/a/ THE 
CLIFFROSE LODGE AND GARDENS; 
THE TOWN OF SPRINGDALE; NORMAN 
SWAPP; ERIC LUDLOW; WASHINGTON 
COUNTY; THE STATE OF UTAH and 
DOES I through CC, 
Defendants/Appellee, 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1 Supreme Court No. 920162 
Plaintiff/Appellant, CHARLES B. JACKSON, (hereafter 
"JACKSON11 respectfully submits the following brief in reply to 
the briefs of Appellees NORMAN SWAPP (hereafter "SWAPP") and DALE 
DOCKSTADER (hereafter "DOCKSTADER"). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although set forth differently in Appellees' briefs, 
Appellees have cor'rectly stated that the standard of review is 
one of correctness. That isf this Court reviews the facts in a 
light most favorable to the appealing party and, in determining 
whether those facts require, as a matter of law, entry of 
judgment for the prevailing party, the appellate court gives no 
deference to the trial Court's conclusions of lav;, which are 
reviewed for correctness. See Blue Cross and jJlue Shield v. 
State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989), Barber v. Farmer's Insurance 
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Exchange, 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988), Geneva Pipe Company v. 
S & H Insurance Company, 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986) and English v. 
Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App.) (Cert, granted 779 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1989)) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant JACKSuN is entitled to reversal of the lower 
courtf s determination on summary judgment v/here there are 
genuine, material issues of fact precluding summary judgment 
regarding time and place of arrest and probable cause. In 
considering the facts in a light most favorable to Appellant. 
There is at least the implication that a reasonable jury v/ould 
have found that neither SWAPP nor DOCKSTADER had probable cause 
to initiate criminal proceedings against JACKSON. JACKSON is 
also entitled to summary judgment on the uncontroverted elements 
ol his claim of malicious prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant submits this single reply brief to both 
Appellees' briefs. Appellant will reply first to the points 
argued by Appellee SWAPP and second to those argued by Appellee 
DOCKSTADER. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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POINT NO, 1 
THERE ARE GENUINE, MATERIAL ISSUES Or FACT 
WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH REGARD TO 
THE TIME AND PLACE OF ARREST AND PROBABLE 
CAUSE. 
SWAPP contends that there is no issue of fact with 
regard to the time and place of arrest, because it v/as up to the 
court to determine when the arrest occurred based upon the facts 
and circumstances of the case. SWAPP contends that when an 
arrest occurs turns on the facts of the'case and not on the 
language expressing those facts and cites to United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 554 (1980). However, the facts and 
circumstances of Mendenhall are distinguishable. This is not a 
case where issues of time and place of arrest were left for the 
courtfs determination based upon its interpretation of the 
conduct or language used under t e circumstances. In this case, 
the time and place of arrest had been stipulated to and agreed 
upon for purposes of summary judgment. The issue of time and 
place of arrest were not even before the court for determination. 
That the time and place of arrest were agreed upon is clear not 
only from the stipulated facts submitted to the court, but also 
from the manner in which SWAPP argued the matter. Whether or not 
the magic v/ord "arrest" was used is immaterial. The point is, 
for purposes of summary judgment, the issues of time and place of 
arrest were agreed upon and set forth in the stipulated facts. 
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The court erred in changing it. 
SWAPPfs citation to Singleton v. Alexander, 431 T\2d 
126 (Utah 1967), is misconstrued which in fact supports JACKSUN'J 
contention. In Singleton this court held that: 
Before the question djf negligence becomes one 
of law, for the court, the facts shown by the 
evidence must be such that all reasonable »aen 
must draw the same conclusions from them. If 
the facts proven are such that reasonable men 
may fairly differ as to whether or not there 
v/as negligence, the question is one for the 
jury to consider, (emphasis added). Id at 
129. 
Moreover, the court's arbitrary determination of the 
time and place of arrest as being different from that stipulated 
to, pursuant to its rather broad interpretation of Utah Code 
Annotated 77-7-1 (1953, as amended) raises a secondary issue of 
when JACKSON was actually taken into custody and strengthens 
JACKSON's position rather than weakens it. If JACKSON was in 
fact arrested and taken in to Custody at the point indicated by 
the court, then the officers duty was to take him to St. George 
for booking and not to return him to the motel to try to work 
things out. That is precisely why JACKSON's rights v/ere 
violated. The officer was clearly acting outside of his official 
duties by assuming the role of a peacemaker. JACKSON had not 
requested to return to the motel to negotiate settlement, he was 
forced to return under threat of arrest. Thereby SWAPP denied 
JACKSON his rights to due process. Those facts are clear and 
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stipulated to. (R. 171 Paragraphs 27-29.) notwithstanding, the 
moment that the lov/er court determined that the time and place of 
arrest was not as stipulated to there were issues of fact as to 
the time and place arrest which should have gone to the jury. It 
is reasonable to infer that a jury might have viewed those facts 
differently than the court and determined that the arrest 
occurred at a different time and place. 
Additionally, the lower courtfs determination is purely 
arbitrary. This was the third time that JACKSON had been stopped 
by officers and questioned. On the tv/o prior occasions he waj 
detained by federal officers for as long as lie was detained by 
officer SWAPP prior to the "arrest." Following the court's 
reasoning, there is really no distinction between the three. The 
court itself offers no reasons as to why JACKSON was not arrested 
on either of the two prior occasions. However, the error is not 
of when and where , but that the court made its own determination 
as to the time and place of arrest different from that stipulated 
to by the parties. The court in doing so gave rise to an issue 
of fact which should have gone to a jury and not resolved on 
summary judgment. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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POINT NO, 2 
SWAPP WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW WHERE THERE WAS AT LEAST THE 
IMPLICATION OF GENUINE AND MATERIAL ISSUES OF 
FACT. 
The lower court's determination of the time and place 
of arrest becomes self serving v/hen considered in the context of 
the issue of probable cause as it relates to a violation of 42 
U*S.C. Section 1983. The key issue before the court for 
determination submitted on stipulated facts was whether or not 
the officer had probable cause. In fact, this was a concession 
on the part of JACKSON in agreeing that the federal standard 
applied since officer SWAPP clearly did not comply with the state 
standard in obtaining a complaint or warrant prior to making an 
arrest on a misdemeanor charge. 
Further, it was the intention of the parties in 
stipulating to the facts and circumstances of the case and 
submitting the same to the court for its determination to have 
the court find as a matter of 3aw the existence or nonexistence; 
of probe.ble cause?. However, the court's alteration of the time 
and place of arrest changed that perspective and gave rise to 
genuine and material issues of fact regarding arrest, custody and 
probable cause. 
The method of the court's own determination also gives 
rise to at least an inference that SWAPP had no probable cause 
given the facts and circumstances stipulated to by the parties. 
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In fact, officer SWAPP had no probable cause. SWAPP takes 
liberties in characterizing the facts by stating that JACKSON v/as 
"destroying evidence11 or was "attempting to flee from arrest." 
(Appellee SWAPP's Brief, Pages 13 and 14). The facts are to the 
contrary. JACKSON tore up his credit card slip because it 
already had his card imprint on it. He left all the pieces on 
the checkout counter. He v/as not destroying evidence, he was 
preserving his claim of nonpayment. He created evidence by 
tearing up the credit card slip. If the credit card slip had not 
been destroyed there would have been no evidence that he didn't 
pay for the room. 
Moreover, JACKSON admitted doing it, just as he 
admitted using the room. He told both DOCKSTADER and SWAPP why 
he was doing it. There is absolutely no evidence of trickery, 
deception, false pretense or any other conduct inconsistent with 
his intention to preserve his dispute over the bill. 
Likewise, with regard to flight, no where is there any 
evidence of any attempt to flee to avoid arrest. On three 
separate occasions JACKSON allowed himself to be detained and 
patiently discussed the matter thoroughly with officers. On two 
prior occasions the officers v/ere federal officers and fully 
aware of the federal standard of probable cause but believed that 
no crime had been committed. It is far fetched to assume that a 
federal officer would detain an individual suspected of 
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committing a crime and then allow him to go on if they had 
probable cause that the crime had been committed, because they 
were too busy checking people into Zions National Park. It is 
incredulous that a federal officer would detain somebody along a 
trail in a national park whom they suspected as having committed 
a crime, to discuss the matter thoroughly and not make an arrest 
if there was probable cause. It cannot be construed that it was 
reasonable for SWAPP to believe he had probable cause v/hen on two 
prior occasions two separate federal officers did not believe 
that such existed. How is it that this officer, whom the court 
found to have a "reasonable belief11 found it necessary to return 
back to the motel to "straighten things out?" 
In short, as evidenced by the court's method in 
deliberating on this issue, certain facts must be altered or 
manipulated and others ignored, together with the implications 
derived therefrom, in order to find the existence of probable 
cause. JACKSON maintains that such gives rise to at least the 
implication that there were issues of fact that should have gone 
to a jury. At least one of those facts is that JACKSON was never 
convicted of the offense and in fact charges were dropped on the 
prosecuting attorney's initiative the day of trial.1 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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1
 Both DOCKSTADER and SV7APP have made reference to the 
fact that JACKSON was never convicted on these charges. Both have 
tried to give the implication of some type of impropriety upon 
which they fail to elaborate. In fact, neither party nor their 
respective counsel were present during the proceedings. 
Notwithstanding, they raise issues of the credibility and 
integrity of JACKSON and so the that this court can be more fully 
advised, Counsel briefly summarizes what transpired. 
CHARLES B. JACKSON is the older brother of Judge JOSEPH 
E. JACKSON, the Fifth Judicial District Juvenile Court Judge of 
Utah. That makes him J. Bryan Jackson's uncle. Mr. Jackson 
represented him in the criminal proceedings and represents him as 
co-counsel in these civil proceedings. During the criminal 
proceedings, the Washington County attorney's office through then 
deputy County Attorney, Eric Ludlow, made on offer to dismiss the 
criminal charge of theft of services if Appellant paid the motel 
bill and agreed not to initiate civil proceedings against the 
county. Mr. Jackson communicated the offer to his uncle. 
Appellant refused. Counsel communicated this response to the 
VJashington County Attorney's office. He then submitted the 
points and authorities in support of my [lotion to Dismiss 
regarding the charges. The County Attorney's office did not 
respond. On the morning of trial, Mr. Jackson contacted Ilr. 
Ludlow to discuss with him counsel's memorandum and motion to 
dismiss. Mr. I/udlow stated that he agreed with counsel's 
position and that it was his intention to dismiss the charges. 
Appellant was there, in St. George, Utah, with his witnesses, 
prepared to go forward with trial that afternoun. Counsel asked 
Mr. Ludlow if he desired that he be present to make findings on 
the record since it was then Judge Owens' policy to require 
findings of the county .attorney's office when there was a 
dismissal and Mr. Ludlow said that it would not be necessary. 
i.'hat resulted was an order of dismissal setting forth that 
Appellant lacked criminal intent. Judge Jackson knew nothing 
about the case other than the fact that he heard indirectly that 
Appellant had been arrested. He heard that from Mr. Jackson. 
Judge Jackson certainly had nothing to do with the criminal 
proceedings. There was no reason for him to be involved or even 
be advised of the matter, although it was the first time that his 
older brother had ever been arrested for anything. To imply that 
either of these two gentlemen would abuse or misuse their 
relationship and respective positions to get the criminal matter 
dismissed or to strengthen the position in these civil 
proceedings is scandalous and completely without merit or good 
sense. To imply that counsel had some undue power or influence 
over the Washington County Attorney's office in getting charges 
dropped, grossly overestimates Mr. Bryan Jackson's abilities. 
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POINT NO, 3 
JACKSON WAS COMPELLED TO NEGOTIATE SETTLEMENT 
OF THE DISPUTE WITH DOCKSTADER UNDER THREAT 
OF ARREST. 
SWAPP's argument under Point No. 3 of his brief illustrates 
the inconsistency of his position. Under Point No. 1 he argues 
that the fact that JACKSON was compelled to return with him is 
what constitutes the arrest prior to returning to the motel. He 
argues in support of the courtfs finding that JACKSON suffered an 
arrest when he was compelled to return back to the motel under 
threat of arrest. On the other hand, if he wasn't compelled to 
go back and negotiate a settlement v/ith DOCKSTADER, then the time 
and place of arrest is at issue. Notwithstanding, the stipulated 
facts clearly show that JACKSON was compelled to return at that 
moment to settle the bill. That is the essence of the due 
process claim since SWAPP was assuming a role of prosecutor, 
witness, judge and jury on the matter. JACKSON was told that if 
he didn't do it then he would be arrested. v/hen he refused to 
pay the bill, JACKSON was arrested. Neither the State of Utah 
nor Washington County had an interest in whether the bill was 
being paid. Their legitimate interest dealt v/ith whether or not 
a crime had been committed. Calling DOCKSTADER a victim doesn't 
change that perspective. Negotiating settlement had nothing to 
do v/ith investigating a crime. It served no legitimate 
-10-
governmental purpose. JACKSON was discriminated against because 
he was not a resident of Washington County. 
Last, the construction and interpretation contended by 
SWAPP set up an unworkable standard in applying 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983. It allows the lower court to assume and apply the facts it 
deems pertinent, alter stipulations, disregard controverted facts 
it deems immaterial to make a finding of probable cause and then 
in t;he same test disregard those very facts to find no violation 
of due process or equal protection. The standard is unworkable. 
POINT NO. 4 
THE ISSUE OF PROBABLE CAUSE WAS CONTROVERTED 
AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
DETERMINATION UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE. 
The issue on appeal is not whether DOCKSTADER had 
probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings against JACKSON. 
The issue is whether the courtfs determination is correct where 
there existed both controverted and uncontroverted facts as to 
the issue of probable cause. When those facts are considered in 
a light most favorable to JACKSON there are issues of fact which 
should have gone to the jury. DOCKSTADER argues that probable 
cause is not a jury question. It shows that he chooses to ignore 
the specific language in the Hodges v. Gibbson Products Co. , 011 
P.2d 151, 159 (Utah 1991), which expressly makes probable cause 
an issue of fact for the jury. 
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DOCKSTADER attempts to argue that Hodges is 
distinguishable because the facts supporting probable cause were 
"hotly contested.11 The degree to which facts are contested has 
never been the standard for purposes of summary judgment. To the 
contrary, the case law is replete and has been cited to 
extensively by all parties that summary judgment is not 
appropriate where there are controverted, genuine, material 
issues of fact, no matter how "hotly11 they are contested. 
JACKSON on review is entitled not only an interpretation of those 
facts in a light most favorable to him, but also all inferences 
in his favor which can be drawn therefrom. 
Summary judgment is only appropriate to resolve issues 
of law. The fact that such determination was not appropriate 
under the circumstances of this case is evidenced by the court's 
own conduct. In essence, the court made ito determination by 
accepting as complete those facts which were not in dispute and 
ignoring entirely the controverted issues of fact which were 
before it. The court erred in determining that under any set of 
facts a reasonable jury would find probable cause. (T 2 at Page 
31). That would not be true if the jury believed that JACKSON 
was justified in not paying for the room. 
DOCKSTADER cites to Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1976) for the proposition that the v/hole purpose of suimuary 
judgment is to eliminate unnecessary issues for trial. However, 
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in the instant case, the issues, which are genuine and material, 
are necessary. The Rich case supports JACKSONfs position, 
wherein this Court held: 
In as much as a party moved against is being 
defeated without the privilege of trial, the 
court should carefully scrutinize 
"submissions" and contentions he makes 
thereon to see if his contentions and 
proposals as to proof of material facts, if 
resolved in his favor would entitle him to 
prevail; and if it so appears, the motion for 
summary judgment should be denied and a trial 
should be had for the purpose of resolving 
the disputed issues of facts and determining 
the rights of the parties. See also 
Transamerican Title Insurance Company v. 
United Resources Inc., 471 P.2d 165. 
(emphasis added). 
DOCKSTADER also contends that his affidavit was 
uncontroverted. That is wrong. The affidavit of DOCKSTADER was 
a response affidavit to the Motion and affidavit of JACKSON. It 
was also a response affidavit to the matters set forth in the 
stipulated facts between JACKSON and SWAPP. DOCKSTADER never 
stipulated to those facts because they clearly speak against him. 
Moreover, at hearing on December 13, 1991, certain paragraphs 
were objected to and some stricken. (T 2 at Pages 2-16). In the 
end, the parties stipulate to what DOCKSTADERfs affidavit would 
state, but such were never stipulated to as uncontroverted facto 
for the lower court to consider on summary judgment. 
The issue of whether DOCKSTADER had probable cause goes 
beyond initiating the criminal prosecution and includes 
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continuing it, DOCKSTADER in this instance didnft simply report a 
crime, he repeatedly insisted that federal and local authorities 
arrest JACKSON immediately. When JACKSON v/as brought back to 
DOCKSTADER to negotiate settlement of the matter, strong-armed by 
officer SWAPP, it v/as DOCKSTADER who refused to reason and 
insisted on JACKSON beinq arrested if he didn't pay the bill. (R 
at Page 172, Paragraphs 30-35). Officer SWAPP, although having 
no right to use his authority as a peacemaker in that manner, 
acted under DOCKSTADER1 s mandate in making the arrest. By tiiat 
time, DOCKSTADER knew why the bill was in dispute, he knew or 
should have known that services had not been provided as hj had 
agreed, notwithstanding the use of the room. He refused to 
settle the natter with JACKSON knowing that JACKSON might be 
justified in not paying for the room. lie refused to deal with 
the matter through civil recourse as the law requires. See State 
v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1905) (where there was an implied 
promise to pay and subsequent failure to pay for lodging and 
services at a motel, which, standing alone, were legally 
insufficient to show elements of deception for the theft of 
services) He insisted that JACKSON be arrested. At that time he 
didn't even know v/hat JACKSON v/as going to be arrested for, just 
that he be arrested. 
DOCKSTADER states in his affidavit that his sole and 
solitary purpose was to get his bill paid. (R. at Page 191, 
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Paragraph 13). This court has held that the only proper purpose 
for initiating criminal proceedings is to see that justice is 
done. This court has also held that to initiate criminal 
proceedings to force the accused to pay money is improper, even 
though the money may be lav/fully owed the accuser. See Haas v. 
Emmett, 23 Utah 2 138, 459 P.2d 432 (1969); see also Greenwall v. 
Canyon Lincoln Mercury, 575 P.2d 688 (Utah 1978). 
DOCKSTADER argues that JACKSON!s conduct was criminal 
and that he was the recipient of some tWo-tiered system of 
justice, implying that as the reason the charges were dropped. 
This Court has ruled otherwise. In State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 
650 (Utah 1985), this Court addressed the offense of theft of 
services, stating that: 
[F]radulent intent is the gravamen of the 
offense of theft of services. Without proof 
of a criminal state of mind, the lav; would 
imprison people for mere failure to pay a 
debt, a practice not sanctioned in this or 
any other sta^ te in the nation. Id at 654. 
This court went on to state that "a person who in good 
faith accepts the benefit of services for which he plans to pay 
later, cannot be convicted of theft, even though he subsequently 
does not recompense the provider for the services.11 Id. That is 
exactly what transpired in the instant case and these facts were 
known to DOCKSTADER at the time he initiated and continued 
prosecution. There were no facts or circumstances suggesting 
fraud or deception in the receipt such services or thereafter. 
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These matters were brought to the county attorney's attention 
through JACKSON!s Point and Authorities submitted in connection 
with the criminal proceedings* That was why the county 
attorney's office dismissed the matter v/ith the specific finding 
that there was no criminal intent. (R. at Page 223). JACKSON's 
lack of criminal intent made the charges defective. JACKSON's 
conduct was not criminal because his intent was not criminal. 
Moreover, these were matters known by both DOCKSTADER and SWAPP, 
who received the information first hand- and that is v/hy neither 
had probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings. 
POINT NO. 5 
ALTHOUGH THE LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF 
JACKSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
JACKSQN WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE ALL CONTROVERTED 
ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, INCLUDING 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The circumstances upon which JACKSON filed Motion for 
Summary Judgment were that DOCKSTADER attempted to answer 
JACKSON's complaint, on his own and in so answering had not denied 
the essential elements regarding malicious prosecution. JACKSON 
moved for summary judgment as to liability. Prior to the matter 
being heard, DOCKSTADER retained counsel who attempted to amend 
and supplement DOCKSTADER's ansv/er in the form of DOCrSTADER's 
affidavit and moved for cross summary judgment on the issue of 
probable cause. This action itself shows that there arose issues 
of fact regarding probable cause. Granting summary judgment 
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would have been improper either way. JACKSON argued that at 
hearing (T 2 at Page 28). The court erred in not denyino both 
motions for summary judgment and submitting the matter for a 
determination by the jury. 
POINT NO, 6 
JACKSON WAS ENTITLED TO A DETERMINATION AND 
FINDINGS ON THOSE UNCONTROVERTED ELEMENTS OF 
HIS CLAIM FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. 
DOCKSTADER argues that JACKSON is not entitled to a 
determination on uncontroverted elements of malicious prosecution 
because he failed to identify his motion for summary judgment as 
"partial" summary judgment. DOCKSTADER argues that this matter 
is not properly before the court. The motion and memorandum were 
submitted to the lower court on or about September 27, 1991 (R. 
at 25 to 29). These matters were argued before the court on 
December 18, 1991 (T2 at 25 to 29). DOCKSTADER only contested 
the issue of probable cause and JACKSON requested a determination 
by the lower court as to the uncontroverted elements of malicious 
prosecution. The matter was proper and should be considered on 
appeal. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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CONCLUSION 
For those reasons stated above, JACKSON respectfully 
requests this Court's reversal and remand viith directions to tha 
tria] accordingly and award to JACKSON his costs incurred belov/ 
and on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of , 
19 
FLOYD W HOLM 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
DATED this day of , 19 
J. BRY7VN JACKSON 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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